Response to My Respondents by D'Costa, Gavin
                          D'Costa, G. (2017). Response to My Respondents. Nova et Vetera, 15(1),
309-329.
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online
via St Paul Center at https://stpaulcenter.com/product/nova-et-vetera-winter-2017-vol-15-no-1/. Please refer to
any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms
Gavin D’Costa: Response to reviews in Nova et Vetera 
 
1 
 
Response from Gavin D’Costa, for Nova et Vetera review of ‘Vatican II. Catholic Doctrines on Jews 
and Muslims’ 
 
Introduction: I am most grateful to Fr Schenk and Professors Reynolds and Echeverria for their 
comments on my book Vatican II. Catholic Doctrines on Jews and Muslims and for their wider 
reflections. I have learnt much and will continue to learn from their writings. In this article I will 
briefly summarize the main arguments of my book (part 1) before responding, in turn, to the critical 
questions they raise (part 2). Summarizing the whole will help when dealing with the parts to which 
they have responded. Readers can of course skip part 1. 
Part 1: Brief summary of ‘Vatican II: Catholic doctrines on Jews and Muslims’ 
My book seeks to return to the Council documents to find out what they teach in terms of doctrines 
regarding other religions in general (chapter 2), and in particular viz. the Jewish people (chapter 3) 
and Muslims (chapter 4). To achieve this, I address two basic questions first (in chapter 1). I inspect 
the hermeneutical debate surrounding the reception of the Council and I clarify what counts as 
doctrine – and what grades of authority are attached, if any, to such ‘doctrines’. I do not concern 
myself with pastoral orientation and practical guidance, only with doctrine, however important the 
former. Echeverria carefully outlines my discussion of the hermeneutical debates with clarity and 
grounds them in their wider context. He also outlines the three basic trajectories of reception which 
loosely map on to admittedly porous labels: ‘liberal’, ‘traditionalist’, and ‘reforming conservative’.  
The first, the ‘liberals’, are primarily historically oriented and Fr Schenk kindly points out that while I 
have put many questions to this group, I also learn deeply from them. More importantly, he rightly 
questions whether this is the best way of labelling them (as ‘historicists’), as they have implicit 
theological presuppositions that drive their position. They are not ‘just’ historically oriented. Some 
of their number emphasise discontinuity, novelty, and deep changes within Catholic sensibilities. I 
am in agreement with some of their findings and much of their historical research is invaluable. 
However, others assert doctrinal discontinuity and this is an important claim that I find problematic. 
This is Fr Schenk’s point about their theological presuppositions. I try to show that on actual 
historical grounds, some of their key claims about discontinuity can be challenged. Briefly, for 
example, there are the teachings of Florence, in the Bull of union with the Copts, (1442),  that at face 
value seems to condemn ‘Jews’, along with heretics and schismatics and pagans to the fires of hell. 
English: ‘It [the Church] firmly believes, professes and preaches that all those who are outside the 
catholic church, not only pagans but also Jews or heretics and schismatics, cannot share in eternal 
life and will go into the everlasting fire which was prepared for the devil and his angels, unless they 
are joined to the catholic church before the end of their lives’. 1 I argue that with historical sensitivity 
we can see that what Florence denotes as ‘Jews’ does not correspond to what Vatican II denotes as 
‘Jews’. The latter are invincibly ignorant. The former are not. Thus the former, at Florence, were 
(probably wrongly) assumed to be guilty of knowing and rejecting the truth of the gospel, thus 
explaining their terrifying and sad final destination. This point does not negate Florence’s authority 
at all nor its proper object of doctrinal teaching - that salvation comes through Christ and his Church 
                                                          
1 Latin: ‘Firmiter credit, profitetur et predicat nullos extra ecclesiam catholicam existentes, non solum paganos, 
sed nec iudeos aut hereticos atque scismaticos eterne vite fieri posse participes, sed in ignem eternum ituros, 
qui paratus est dyabolo et angelis eius (Mt 25, 41), nisi ante finem vite eidem fuerint aggregati, tantum que 
valere ecclesiastici corporis unitatem’. The Arabic is to be found in E Cecconi, Studi storici sul concilio di 
Fierenze, Florence, 1869, last fasc. 61. The English translation is from Tanner, Norman (1990): Decrees of the 
Ecumenical Councils. Volume Two. Trent to Vatican II, (London: Sheed & Ward).  
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and is not available to those who knowingly reject this truth in their minds and hearts. Thus, 
regarding the ‘Jews’, each Council envisages them so differently, but without real contradiction or 
doctrinal discontinuity: they can be construed entirely negatively at Florence; they can be construed 
very positively at Vatican II. My argument against historicists in this instance, is that is not a 
discontinuity of doctrine, but a difference related to a contingent judgement: whether all Jews are 
willful and culpable of rejecting the truth of Christ when they continue to remain Jews. Why I name 
this approach historicist is my belief that their claims can be defeated on historicist grounds.  
The other major claim regarding doctrinal reversal is related to this same statement at Florence: ‘no 
salvation outside the church’, extra ecclesiam nulla salus. Some scholars argue this is overturned at 
Vatican II. Here we have a longer and more complex magisterial tradition to deal with both before 
and after Florence. I argue that this teaching, ‘no salvation outside the church’, is upheld at Vatican 
II, not denied. However, its context is made even clearer. The basic truth it conserves is the claim 
that only through the agency of Christ and his church is salvation attained. In earlier statements, 
such as at Florence, those who were taught to be ‘outside’ are named: Jews, heretics and 
schismatics. Historical studies might show that these named are not properly named for they were 
‘outside’ without culpability and invincible ignorance may apply. Florence was not concerned with 
his latter issue. At Vatican II, there is a recognition that there are many who are invincibly ignorant 
to whom this teaching, ‘no salvation outside the church’, cannot be applied - without qualification. 
This notion of invincible ignorance was always present in theology, but became developed and 
applied to those from other religions particularly during the discovery of the ‘New World’ and it first 
appears in a magisterial teaching in Pope Pius IX’s 1854 encyclical Singulari Quadam. Pius IX, after 
stating there is no salvation outside the church, adds: ‘but, on the other hand, it is necessary to hold 
for certain that they who labour in ignorance of the true religion, if this ignorance is invincible, are 
not stained by any guilt in this matter in the eyes of God.’ 2 He adds how difficult, if not impossible, it 
is to make this contingent judgment regarding particular souls. After this, there is no Conciliar or 
magisterial rendering ‘outside the church there is no salvation’ without this careful qualification. This 
is clarifying the doctrine that has remained true and immutable since it was first taught.  
Each claim for doctrinal discontinuity must be tested historically and contextually. In the wider 
literature there are many claims and each must be tested individually with the pertinent historical 
context carefully examined. My starting point, and here is the chief theological difference between 
such interpreters and myself, is to assume doctrinal continuity if the doctrine is being taught 
authoritatively and continually by the magisterium. This is not a historical starting point, but a 
theological one, but not one that is immune from historical enquiry and critical discussion.  
To carry out this task, one has to know what is authoritative and binding and what is not. Hence, I 
sought to articulate the different grades of doctrinal authority of teachings for one can easily engage 
in fruitless defence of positions at Councils that do not have significant doctrinal authority. I do not 
seek to defend continuity in any absolute sense – only at certain levels of formal authoritative 
teaching. Thus, when Florence starts its teaching with the phrase the Roman Catholic Church ‘firmly 
believes professes and preaches’, one cannot lightly suggest Florence is reversed, reversible or 
wrong, as that would also entail the claim that the magisterium in the operation of its highest 
teaching authority got it wrong on basic doctrinal teaching. However, to hold that Vatican II got it 
right and Florence got it wrong entails a fatal inconsistency, for there would be no good reason to 
accept the magisterium’s teaching at Vatican II if at a de fide level it gets things wrong in the past.  
                                                          
2 Pius IX Pontificis Maximi Acta: Pars Prima, volume L, (Rome: Bonarum Artium, 1864) 620-31, at 626. 
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This is far from the ‘traditionalist’ position, which after all is a mirror opposite to the liberal 
approach. The latter is delighted that discontinuity happens as they celebrate that the Church is now 
teaching truth. The traditionalist is dismayed, as they see the current teaching as erroneous precisely 
because of the denial of previously ‘proclaimed’ truths. Scholars like Russell Hittinger, David 
Schindler and Nicholas J. Healy Jr. have made strenuous efforts to show that both liberals and 
traditionalist are wrong on the question of ‘religious freedom’. Likewise, Cardinal Avery Dulles and 
others have contested John Noonan’s claims that slavery and usury are examples of ‘doctrinal’ 
discontinuity. 3 
It is at this stage that Fr Schenk and Echeverria pose probing questions to my own position. Fr 
Schenk asks whether I depart from Cardinal Ratzinger and Pope Benedict and Cardinal Koch on their 
hermeneutics of reform when it comes to the question of the Jews. I seem to resist certain changes 
that they have promoted regarding mission to the Jewish people. Echeverria and Fr Schenk ask for 
clarification of my position regarding the conceptual resources and metaphysics underpinning my 
alignment with the third group. Should I have employed Newman’s notion of ‘principles’ to 
articulate what is ‘continuous’ and what gives grounds for ‘development’? Should I make it clear that 
while I am sympathetic with a historicist approach to texts I can successfully eschew relativizing 
doctrinal truth in terms of my historicizing doctrinal expressions? I will attend to these important 
questions below. But back to the narrative of the book.  
I defend the third position, a hermeneutic of continuity and reform and acknowledge ‘novel’ 
teachings (the first time the solemn magisterium addresses a particular question). By novel, I mean 
that the magisterium has not spoken solemnly and positively about Jews and Muslims as it does in 
Lumen Gentium 16. In one sense, there is no novel teaching, as everything must be founded in what 
is given, in scripture. Novelty can be the recovery of scripture to address a question that was not 
addressed before, or not addressed with this particular scriptural foundation. The use of Romans 9-
11 would be an example of the latter, where this section of scripture, always within the Church’s 
treasury and deposit of faith, is now mobilized afresh to consider the Jewish question. Development 
is using previous teachings as building blocks to develop fresh implications.  
I also note the reading documents requires a proper hermeneutic in employing Constitutions to 
interpret Decrees. In the recent anniversary of Nostra Aetate, too often that document is read apart 
from Lumen Gentium 14-16, which is the dogmatic backbone upon which the flesh of Nostra Aetate 
is stretched out. This hermeneutic also freely allows repentance and acknowledgment of deep 
failings and abuses within church practices and false notes in non-authoritative doctrinal traditions. 
Regarding the latter there have always been many unresolved theological traditions, sometimes in 
downright contradiction to each other.  This is how theology grows and is often the context of 
magisterial intervention as is the case with post-conciliar teachings regarding the unicity of Christ 
and the salvific efficacy of Christ. See for example the intervention of Dominus Iesus (2000).    
                                                          
3 See Dulles, Avery Cardinal ‘Dignitatis Humanae and the Development of Catholic Doctrine’, Catholicism and 
Religious Freedom: Contemporary Reflections on Vatican II’s Declaration on Religious Liberty, ed. Kenneth L. 
Grasso and Robert P. Hunt, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield), pp. 43-67; David L. Schindler & Nicholas J. Healy 
Jr., Freedom, Truth, and Human Dignity. The Second Vatican Council’s Declaration on Religion Freedom. A New 
Translation, Redaction History, and Interpretation of Dignitatis Humanae, (Grand Rapids: Michigan, Eerdmans, 
2015); and Russel Hittinger, ‘The Declaration on Religious Liberty, Dignitatis Humanae’, in eds. Lamb, Matthew 
L. & Matthew Levering, Vatican II. Renewal within Tradition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 359-82. 
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In employing this hermeneutic, while learning from the other approaches, Echeverria rightly notes 
that my main inspirations are Newman, Congar, and Cardinal Ratzinger/Pope Benedict. From this 
viewpoint, one can embrace historical critical scholarship of the Council and many of their findings 
that are not driven by problematic ecclesiological theological underpinnings. One can also 
appreciate the concerns of the ‘traditionalist’ who wish to uphold previous authoritative doctrinal 
teachings and are concerned that one cannot simply put them aside or relativize them. One problem 
with the traditionalist is that they, like the liberal group, see discontinuity when there is none: as per 
the Jews, and likewise with extra ecclesiam nulla salus. Another problem is their absolutizing one 
particular teaching at the cost of others in an ahistorical manner. The then Cardinal Ratzinger put it 
nicely when he said of this group’s stance: ‘it is an illogical position. The point of departure for this 
tendency is, in fact, the strictest fidelity to the teaching particularly of Pius IX and Pius X … But why 
only the popes up to Pius XII and not  beyond? Is perhaps obedience to the Holy See divisible 
according to years or according to the nearness of a teaching to one’s own already-established 
conviction?’ 4 It is with this theological, historical, gradated hermeneutic that I turn to the Council.  
To view the doctrines on the Jews and Muslims, without detracting from each of their unique 
particularities, I first ask: what is the Church’s attitude to non-Christian religions as a generic 
category? Only within this general framework can one then situate particular religions. To secure 
this claim, my close exegesis of the first sentence of Lumen Gentium 16 is crucial. The note in this 
sentence indicates that religions in general, when invincibly ignorant of the gospel, have an 
orientation (ordinantur) towards Christ. This telos towards Christ, the trinity and Church, frames the 
paragraph, just as the closing sentence of Lumen Gentium 16 on the universal necessity of mission, 
closes the frame. This leads into paragraph 17 that is concerned to reiterate the necessity of 
universal mission so that the Father, Son and Spirit may be known and the invite to participate in the 
divine life be a universal invitation. Regarding the latter point, Ralph Martin’s important work has 
drawn proper attention to this dynamic. 5 Hence, while Lumen Gentium 16 allows for the religions to 
be viewed positively, there are certain earlier theological traditions/assumptions that still bear upon 
this positive appreciation. These are: those referred to are assumed to be in invincible ignorance of 
the gospel; despite any positive statements, the necessity of universal mission towards all religions is 
required; that Christ is the head of all humanity and thus of all religions, but only in potentiality, not 
actuality (for actuality, explicitly confessing Christ is required in this life or at death); that the world 
religions are best viewed as praeparatio evangelica to the gospel; and at worst, they are viewed as in 
differing ways particularly vulnerable to Satan and sin as they lack the full truth of Father, Son and 
Spirit. The final salvific destination of those in other religions is not known. They cannot be deemed 
lost as salvation is possible for all people. They cannot be deemed as saved, for finally salvation is 
the explicit enjoyment of the triune God in beatific bliss. It is vital to hold these careful qualifications 
together with the remarkable positive attitudes developed in the Council towards Jews and Muslims. 
This then is the argument of chapter two. 
The chapter I devote to the Jews reiterates some of the arguments above and closely inspects what 
is said particularly of the Jewish people. The conclusions of this chapter show three doctrinal 
teachings are advanced. First, not all Jews at the time of Jesus, nor Jews since that time, including 
contemporary Jews, can be held collectively guilty of killing Jesus Christ. This is now usually taken for 
                                                          
4 Ratzinger, Joseph (1985): The Ratzinger Report. An Inclusive Interview on the State of the Church with Vittorio 
Messori, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press) tran. Salvator Attanasio & Graham Harrison, 31. 
 
5 Martin, Ralph (2012): Will Many Be Saved? What Vatican II actually teaches and its implications for the New 
Evangelization, (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans).  
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granted in most Christian circles today, but this was not the case of many Catholics at the time of the 
Council. In some ways this was odd as the Tridentine Catechism (1566) had already acknowledged 
that the ‘principal reason’ for Christ’s death was ‘sin’ which ‘seems graver in our case than it was in 
that of the Jews; for the Jews, as the same Apostle says, ‘would never have crucified the Lord of 
glory if they had known him’ (1 Cor 2.8). We ourselves maintain that we do know him, and yet we 
lay, as it were, violent hands on him by disowning him in our actions.’ 6 In Vatican II, in Nostra Aetate 
the Conciliar magisterium clarifies the deposit of faith in the scripture regarding the culpability for 
the death of Jesus Christ. The Jewish historian Jules Isaac had presented this as the issue that 
required reform if Christian traditions of anti-Judaism were to be deconstructed.  
The second doctrinal teaching denotes the Council’s recovery of Romans 9-11 and placing it before 
the Church, quite literally in verbatim form in Lumen Gentium 16: they are ‘the people to whom the 
testaments and promises were given and from whom Christ was born according to the flesh (see 
Rom 9. 4-5), a people according to their election most dear because of their ancestors: for God never 
goes back on his gifts and his calling (see Rom 11, 28-29).’ 7 The Council teaches with St. Paul, that 
God’s ancient people to whom these covenants and promises were made are not rejected by God 
because of their beloved ancestors, to whom these covenants and promises were given. I argue that 
the Council did not attend to the two most debated issues after the Council: have the Jewish people 
today remained faithful to this covenant in the objective order?; and what is the status of this 
covenant today: is it abrogated, superseded or fulfilled? The implication from the official relatio is 
that the answer to the second question is that the Jewish covenant is ‘fulfilled’, but supersessionism 
is not formally addressed. My conclusion has been criticised in some reviews (elsewhere) as turning 
the clock back to pre-Vatican II days. Fortunately, the Pontifical Commission for Religious Relations 
with the Jews has published: ‘"The gifts and the calling of God are irrevocable" (Rom 11:29). A 
Reflection on Theological Questions Pertaining to Catholic – Jewish Relations on the Occasion of 
the 50th Anniversary of "Nostra Aetate" (no.4)’ [Henceforth: Gift]. In Gift, 39 it is stated of the 
Council texts that they are ‘not infrequently over–interpreted, and things are read into it [Nostra 
Aetate] which it does not in fact contain. An important example of over–interpretation would be the 
following: that the covenant that God made with his people Israel perdures and is never invalidated. 
Although this statement is true, it cannot be explicitly read into “Nostra aetate” (No. 4). This 
statement was instead first made with full clarity by Saint Pope John Paul II when he said during a 
meeting with Jewish representatives in Mainz on 17 November 1980 that the Old Covenant had 
never been revoked by God: “The first dimension of this dialogue, that is, the meeting between the 
people of God of the Old Covenant, never revoked by God … and that of the New Covenant, is at the 
same time a dialogue within our Church, that is to say, between the first and the second part of her 
Bible” The same conviction is stated also in the Catechism of the Church in 1993: “The Old Covenant 
has never been revoked” (121).’ It is one of the wonderful twists of the Council that its greatest gift 
to the church is putting St Paul back into the debate, which the post-Conciliar church now grapples 
with.  
My third and final argument about the Jews was that mission to the Jewish people was implicitly 
assumed, not explicitly taught (for a host of contingent non-theological reasons – see below). The 
universal necessity of mission was taught while respecting the Jewish religion and also holding to the 
                                                          
6 Tridentine Catechism: http://www.angelfire.com/art/cactussong/TridentineCatechism.htm 
translation and preface are by John A. McHugh, O.P. and Charles J. Callan, O.P. (1923) 
7 Latin: In primis quidem populus ille cui data fuerunt testamenta et promissa et ex quo Christus ortus est 
secundum carnem (cf. Rom 9,4-5), populus secundum electionem carissimus propter patres: sine poenitentia 
enim sunt dona et vocatio Dei (cf. Rom 11,28-29). 
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vital importance of religious freedom and the excluding of all coercion in religious matters. Since this 
was a sort of ‘negative conclusion’, precisely because there is no explicit teaching about mission to 
the Jews, in principle this teaching does not have a doctrinal status other than in the general 
injunction during the Council regarding the universal mission of the Church. Fr Schenk fairly 
questions me on this point. For these three doctrinal teachings, I indicate speculatively the level of 
authority attributable to each. None are de fide. The only de fide teaching examined in the entire 
study is the teaching: ‘no salvation outside the church’.  
Regarding the Muslims I isolate two doctrinal teachings. First, the God that Muslims worship is the 
true God that Christians worship. I note that argumentation for this teaching is complex and 
certainly not resolved, and keeps in tension the Christian claim regarding Jesus that means that God 
is trinity. The trinity is of course unacceptable to Muslims, for classically many have viewed this as 
tritheism. The second teaching is that the attributes upon which this predication ‘same God’ is 
actually made, is related to God as ‘creator’, ‘judge’ and giver of the ‘moral law’. These predicates 
can be attributed to the God of Islam, even if it is also implicitly thought that Islam has not always 
applied and understood this moral law correctly. One can see this ‘implicit thought’ clearly in the 
drafting of the documents where polygamy provided a clear example of misinterpreting the law of 
God and Nostra Aetate was changed accordingly. The steps taken towards Islam are halting and 
delicately poised. This tentativeness and precariousness properly reflects the state of debate and 
levels of possible consensus in the Catholic Church at that time (and at present). My reading of 
Reynold’s commentary is that he does not find fault in my interpretation of the Council. I’m grateful 
to him for adding to the material background I discuss and to the vistas and perspectives that open 
up in the light of my reading.  
The basic purpose of the book was to isolate clearly what the Council actually taught in the light of 
the protracted debate after the Council about its teachings on the religions. If this important 
foundation is clarified, it should help post-conciliar theology and practice. Of course post-conciliar 
theology and practice is not bound by the topics and concerns of the Council, although a clear 
historiography, guided by a proper theology, of this post-conciliar process is still required in scholarly 
literature. My book was a first step towards such a task.  
 
Part 2: Responding to some critical issues 
Doctrinal continuity and discontinuity. Fr Schenk rightly wants a more differentiated and complex 
account of this theme in two particular respects. He wishes that I had employed Newman’s 
conceptuality more rigorously. He thinks I sometimes play down the genuine elements of doctrinal 
development that took place at the Council. On Newman, I think he is right. I plead guilty due to 
shortage of space in the book. However, I am not entirely sure that where ‘Newman settled for a 
vague description of the relationship between unchanging but less clearly thematized principles and 
the expressed doctrines needing to develop in order to keep such principles constant and vital, 
D'Costa appeals to the handbook schematic of graded propositions.’ I appealed to the handbook 
schematically graded propositions only to run alongside the theme of developing doctrines so as to 
more precisely catalogue what cannot be reversed in the process as it is unchanging because of a 
very high degree of authority; and what might be reversed, changed and seen as accidental to the 
real doctrinal object of teaching, because such elements have little or no authority attributed to it. It 
is precisely this sifting that allows me to argue that the ‘Jews’ as such are not the object of doctrinal 
teachings in earlier Council teachings such as Florence.  
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The ‘Jews’ of Florence are not the ‘Jews’ of today and in that sense, when Florence teaches no 
salvation outside the church and relates this to ‘Jews’, the object of the de fide teaching is not that 
the ‘Jews’ are damned, but that the particular class of people who know and reject the truth of the 
gospel, the ‘Jews’ of Florence, are damned. Whether this actually applies to the Jews at the time of 
Florence in terms of the dogmatic truth of extra ecclesiam nulla salus is actually a contingent 
question. It would depend on whether the actual Jews at the time were genuinely in receipt of the 
gospel and freely rejected its truth, while knowing it in their minds and heart to be the truth. That 
this group, the ‘Jews’, are named in Florence, does of course pertain to the terrible persecutions 
undergone by the Jewish people by Catholics. But doctrinally, the ‘Jews’ are not the proper object of 
the teaching of Florence. This insight allows the changes that happen in Vatican II to be made, 
without doctrinal discontinuity or contradiction being claimed against Vatican II. For by being able to 
isolate what is de fide (there is no salvation outside Christ and his Church) and what is accidental to 
the expression of that de fide teaching (that those outside are identified to be Jews, heretics and 
schismatics), we can argue for both continuity and development with discontinuity at the non-
doctrinal level. 
Is Vatican II’s formulation of ‘no salvation outside the church’ in Lumen Gentium a ‘development’ of 
doctrine or simply a clarification of it? Here I think we can find help in Newman who suggests that 
we cannot always tell immediately, and most often we can best make such a judgment in retrospect. 
The basic principle is retained, clearly, but with this new addition (culpability or invincible 
ignorance), there is a step forward at Vatican II, which has a precedence in papal magisterium 
teaching, in showing that this teaching cannot be used to damn the invincibly ignorant. This 
achievement, a kind of building block, is then used two paragraphs later in Lumen Gentium 16. So at 
Vatican II those who had previously been seen as destined for damnation at Florence are now 
reconceptualised in para. 16 as related [ordinantur] to the people of God and potentially included in 
his salvific plan. We may be better placed to judge whether there is development or clarification 
through an examination of post-conciliar teachings.   
In one respect Fr Schenk is perhaps right about my book. I may inadvertently play down doctrinal 
development, but that is because I’m not entirely sure that we can isolate genuine and clearly 
established doctrinal developments in an area where the Council does not draw explicit attention to 
its teaching authority. To avoid problems like this, I had made the plea for the labelling of teachings 
in terms of the grades of authority attributed to doctrinal teachings. This is not an idealizing of and 
wishing to return to earlier neo-scholastic days, although I’d be happy enough for such precision to 
return to theology, it is simply a concern to clarify the level of authority behind Conciliar and 
magisterial teachings, knowing that this would simplify the theologians’ and the faithful’ task in 
terms of reception, obedience, questioning and practice. Regarding other religions in general, and 
Jews and Muslims in particular, I think the Council provides a tentative step forward, opening paths 
that might be productive and creative. It can only do so through doctrine, not good will alone. At the 
end of my book I isolate the teachings on other religions and on the Jews and Muslims and classify 
them, precisely to help free the debate from misconceptions about what is ‘authoritatively’ taught 
and is unchanging. My finding is that the only de fide teaching amongst everything that I examine, is 
the no salvation outside the church teaching. That such a teaching has developed alongside a series 
of other doctrinal teachings requires this careful sifting and grading of teachings.  
Mission to the Jewish people: Fr Schenk suggests that my argument that mission to the Jewish 
people is implicit in Vatican II is contrary to the unfolding of the Council as interpreted by Cardinal 
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Koch in his writings and in Gift. 8 We must recall that the ‘Preface’ to Gift is clear that it has no 
magisterial status and is a discussion document: ‘The text is not a magisterial document or doctrinal 
teaching of the Catholic Church, but is a reflection prepared by the Commission for Religious 
Relations with the Jews on current theological questions that have developed since the Second 
Vatican Council. It is intended to be a starting point for further theological thought with a view to 
enriching and intensifying the theological dimension of Jewish–Catholic dialogue.’ Nevertheless, it is 
a document produced with the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, so it has two important 
dicasteries coming together to try and plot out the state of the debate in Catholic teachings.  
On the subject of mission, quoted by Fr Schenk, Gift 40 says: ‘The Church is therefore obliged to view 
evangelisation to Jews, who believe in the one God, in a different manner from that to people of 
other religions and world views. In concrete terms this means that the Catholic Church neither 
conducts nor supports any specific institutional mission work directed towards Jews. While there is a 
principled rejection of an institutional Jewish mission, Christians are nonetheless called to bear 
witness to their faith in Jesus Christ also to Jews, although they should do so in a humble and 
sensitive manner, acknowledging that Jews are bearers of God’s Word, and particularly in view of 
the great tragedy of the Shoah.’ The first line is true, even if it raises the issue whether Muslims, 
acknowledged by Lumen Gentium 16, ‘along with us adore the one and merciful God’, also thus 
require a different manner of evangelization. Fr Schenk also registers the same challenge regarding 
mission to Islam. I agree with him generically that the manner of mission must be related to the 
truths within a particular religion and this careful attention to apologetics and sensitive dialogue has 
characterised the best aspects of Catholic missionary history. There is no general mission strategy, 
but only particular strategies in the light of specific religions at precise times and locations in history.  
However, in my view, the second line of the quotation raises some problems. It does not clearly 
follow from the first. It seems to be contrary to Vatican II and the principled arguments are never 
presented explicitly in the document. I think it runs in tension with the Council because Lumen 
Gentium 14 -16 indicates that other than separated Christians who confess Christ and are trinitarian, 
the Church’s mission is towards all those who do not know Christ.  Lumen Gentium 16 acknowledges 
different types within this group who do not know Christ: those who know God (Jews and Muslims); 
those who believe in a transcendent; those who are not ‘religious’ but follow the voice of God in 
their conscience. But while these groups are different and some have ‘revelation’ (certainly the Jews 
in the Old Testament, and by derivation Muslims through the Qur’an’s dependence on the Old and 
New Testaments), does Gift overturn Lumen Gentium 14-16 and Ad Gentes? This is most unlikely. 
While the Jews are admittedly not ‘gentiles’ (gentes), they do not confess and believe in Jesus Christ 
and the trinity. In the context of Lumen Gentium they are thus the ‘object’ of mission for God wishes 
all men and women to come to Him through Christ. The problem is further compounded as Gift 
argues that it is only Christ’s actions that brings salvation and this is a non-negotiable truth. Gift 
openly acknowledges the conundrum: ‘That the Jews are participants in God’s salvation is 
theologically unquestionable, but how that can be possible without confessing Christ explicitly, is 
and remains an unfathomable divine mystery.’ (36) This tension, or ‘unfathomable divine mystery’, 
seems to be resolved on one side of the horns of the dilemma (no institutional mission, while 
mission is the greatest gift the church can offer, indeed, is the very rationale of the Church). If 
explicitly confessing Christ is the normal means of salvation, not carrying out mission to the Jewish 
people is profoundly un-Pauline. Paul did not stop his activities towards the Jews. It is also possibly 
                                                          
8 See also: D’Costa, Gavin (2012): ‘What does the Catholic Church Teach about Mission to the Jewish People?’, 
Theological Studies, 73, 3, 590-614.  
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deeply uncharitable for mission, properly understood, is nothing other than sharing the best gift that 
has been freely given to us and is no one’s property: Jesus Christ.   
Furthermore, not only is the claim in tension with some of the Conciliar teachings. I think there is an 
internal tension to Gift at this point. One might ask to what other religion is there a ‘specific 
institutional mission’ in contrast to the disavowal made here? Historically, the Congrégation de 
Notre-Dame de Sion, the Sisters of Zion, were devoted to the conversion of the Jewish people and 
sanctioned by the Church (in the late 19th century). Even if they now carry out a practice that seems 
to be an inversion of their founders’ aims, in this historical respect, there has been ‘specific 
institutional’ missionary activity towards the Jewish people within the Church. Ironically, there are 
no religious orders that were founded to convert Buddhists and Hindus and there is no specific 
institutional mission towards Buddhists and Hindus today. Hence, there is a genuine ambiguity in 
this second line: to what other religions are there institutional missions?; and what is the theological 
rationale for disallowing institutional mission? Gift cannot and should not be expected to answer 
every theological question it raises for its purpose was precisely to set in motion a discussion on the 
agenda it set forth.  
The third line of the key quotation from Gift does not resolve the problem, but deepens it. Personal 
sensitive and thoughtful witness is enjoined, and two paragraphs later, witness is rightly seen as a 
form of mission: ‘Christian mission and witness, in personal life and in proclamation, belong 
together’ (42). Gift thus seems to propound a position that holds that there should be no 
institutional mission by the Catholic Church to the Jewish people and only individual personal 
mission is legitimate. However, this is a most curious distinction in Catholic theology and reverses 
the normal ordering: the Church is understood to be the person of Christ first and foremost, and 
only secondarily, the individual people who constitute the unity of the Body of Christ, who partake in 
the ministry of Christ, carry out its actions. Its institutional character is integrated into its personal 
sacramental character. But all is not lost, as my own (possibly eccentric) reading of Gift is that it 
points, inadvertently or not, to a more profound resolution of this issue that is only just beginning to 
become clear as the Church wrestles with its own Jewish roots and identity. There is textual 
evidence for this alternative reading.  
One way to understand this apparently mixed message about ‘mission’ might be recognising that 
there is an inchoate and visionary insight that the gentile church cannot partake in mission to the 
Jews as this does signal the erasure of Jewish identity – and has done historically. The Catholic 
Church has a long history of requiring the relinquishing of Jewish identity and practices from either 
Jewish coverts or even those, such as the Copts who practiced circumcision, to establish a proper 
claim upon the title, ‘Catholic Christian’. (The discussion of Florence cited above is actually to the 
Copts, who the Roman Church was trying to reign in). Gift recognises that in the original church 
there were two communities that co-existed, the church of the gentiles and the church of the 
circumcised: ‘The first Christians were Jews; as a matter of course they gathered as part of the 
community in the Synagogue, they observed the dietary laws, the Sabbath and the requirement of 
circumcision, while at the same time confessing Jesus as the Christ, the Messiah sent by God for the 
salvation of Israel and the entire human race. With Paul the ‘Jewish Jesus movement’ definitively 
opens up other horizons and transcends its purely Jewish origins. Gradually his concept came to 
prevail, that is, that a non-Jew did not have to become first a Jew in order to confess Christ. In the 
early years of the Church, therefore, there were the so-called Jewish Christians and the Gentile 
Christians, the ecclesia ex circumcisione and the ecclesia ex gentibus, one Church originating from 
Judaism, the other from the Gentiles, who however together constituted the one and only Church of 
Jesus Christ.’ (15) The document returns to this point in an interesting manner, because it this was 
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so, the question must arise, could it not be so again in the light of the recovery of the importance of 
the Jewish identity of Christianity? And it is only out of that Jewish identity, possibly only through 
the ecclesia ex circumcisione, that an authentic mission to Jews can happen that does not spell their 
extinction. I cite paragraph 43 in its entirety as it could make sense in the terms I’ve construed (and I 
would argue, otherwise it is difficult to make sense of it): ‘It is and remains a qualitative definition of 
the Church of the New Covenant that it consists of Jews and Gentiles, even if the quantitative 
proportions of Jewish and Gentile Christians may initially give a different impression. Just as after the 
death and resurrection of Jesus Christ there were not two unrelated covenants, so too the people of 
the covenant of Israel are not disconnected from ‘the people of God drawn from the Gentiles’. 
Rather, the enduring role of the covenant people of Israel in God’s plan of salvation is to relate 
dynamically to the ‘people of God of Jews and Gentiles, united in Christ’, he whom the Church 
confesses as the universal mediator of creation and salvation. In the context of God’s universal will 
of salvation, all people who have not yet received the gospel are aligned with the people of God of 
the New Covenant. "In the first place there is the people to whom the covenants and promises were 
given and from whom Christ was born according to the flesh (cf. Rom 9:4-5). On account of their 
fathers this people remains most dear to God, for he does not repent of the gifts he makes nor of 
the calls he issues (cf. Rom 11:28-29)" (Lumen Gentium, 16). 
The singular people of God from the Council has been pluralised to indicate two very distinct forms 
of being ecclesia, perhaps one where the practices and religious culture of Judaism, as was the case 
with Christ and his disciples, might once more flourish within the Catholic Church. Only such a Jewish 
ecclesia ex circumcisione, such as exists in a inchoate manner in groups such as the Hebrew 
Catholics, could sensitively carry out an ‘institutional mission’ that is not ‘bad news’ for the Jewish 
people.  Only through such a mission could the credibility of the new people of God who remain 
Jewish and Catholic religiously could Jews realise that the invitation to follow Christ does not mean 
erasing their religious culture and identity and cutting themselves off from their people and history. 
Only through such a mission could the Church be confident that it has actually grasped the difficult 
nettle of its own savage destruction of Jewish culture within its teleologically proper home, its 
messianic yearnings. In my view this is the somewhat hidden logic of Gift. Whether this hidden logic 
can break through when Jewish Christians and Hebrew Catholics are such a sensitive issue in Jewish-
Catholic dialogue remains to be seen.  
There is also another way of explaining the logic of Gift’s prohibition upon institutional mission. It is 
seen in the closing line of the paragraph quoted above: it is about the monumental tragedy of the 
Shoah. This dark event must form a deep shadow in all contemporary Christian Jewish relations. 
Susan Heschel tells of her father’s (Rabbi Abraham Heschel) famous statement that was reported 
world-wide during the Council: ‘Some bishops insisted that the ultimate conversion of Jews be 
included in the final version of the document. My father’s objection was unequivocal: the phrase 
had to be eliminated. If faced with the alternative of conversion or death, he said, he would rather 
go to Auschwitz. I was terrified when I heard him say this. My father met with Pope Paul VI to make 
his objection clear, and he said many times that he was told after their meeting that the pope took 
his pen and crossed out the sentence.’ 9 Heschel’s objection indicated unambiguously that any 
Christian intention at mission towards Jews, reminded Jews of an invitation to extinction. That is the 
historical record for Jews as Christians had systematically required converted Jews to renounce all 
                                                          
9 Interview, ‘America’ June 2007, Susannah Heschel (daughter of Abraham Joseph Heschel), (Sourced from: 
‘Stepping Stones’ Dermot A Lane), Accessible online, America Magazine, Last Accessed: 10 June 2012:  
http://www.americamagazine.org/content/article.cfm?article_id=10016 
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Jewish practices and signs of their previous faith. They were required to become ‘gentiles’. Heschel’s 
quote dramatically conveys this point. Possibly the only to avoid this problem, this curse one might 
say, is to envisage a special Hebrew Catholic witness to the Jewish people, showing that Jews who 
follows Jesus are not called to revoke their own spiritual heritage – especially if God does not revoke 
his promises. The radical door opened by Gift calls into question this age old practice of requiring the 
gentilization of Jews. If the Jewish ‘covenant’ is valid and not revoked (what part or all of it still 
remains to be clarified?), then Hebrew Catholics may well be viewed analogously to Anglicans who 
have been granted ordinariate status. They need not and should not renounce their spiritual 
patrimony when entering into full Catholic communion, although anything that conflicted with 
Catholic faith would not be compatible. The level of conflict, if any, would have to be decided and 
determined in close communal exchange. To draw this analogy with the Anglicans is simply to 
suggest that Lumen Gentium 14-15 would have to be rewritten if the ecclesia ex circumcisione were 
to become a thriving reality. I am not clear whether Fr Schenk would find these suggestions 
acceptable, but I believe they address his deeper concerns.  
One other point concerning mission. Reynolds’ article draws attention to the fact that the ‘interest 
of Muslims in converting Christians has reached a fever pitch in the modern period (in part as a 
response to Christian missions among Muslims).’ Would this asymmetry between Islam and Judaism 
mean that the Catholic Church would be open in its missionary attention to Islam, for Muslims are 
open about their own Qur’anic daʿwa, the call to non-Muslims to convert to Islam? This is a 
profound challenge raised by Reynolds. It is one that requires an answer especially as Muslims do 
not see ‘mission’ as an imperializing force of destruction as Jews, perhaps quite rightly, have done. In 
principle, although differently in practice and expression, both Muslims and Jews have resisted the 
trinity as incompatible with pure monotheism. Hence, at the level of apologetics, this incompatibility 
requires addressing. Given the complex power relations that obtain between these three religions, 
the Council’s call to mission, respecting religions and their freedoms and the freedom from all 
coercion is a most timely reminder. Mission must resist the lure and trappings of making Christianity 
an ‘attractive option’ (because of wealth, power, status, and so on) and attend to the sheer beauty 
and truth of the gospel as being its prime attraction. And this question of religious freedom and lack 
of coercion of any sort regarding religious adherence raises a difficult question for both Muslims and 
Jews. The Vatican has been consistent since the time of St. Pope John Paul II in raising the question 
of religious freedoms for Christians in Muslim countries, without very calling into question Islam’s 
freedom to practice da‘wa. The Vatican has also made diplomatic representation about Israel’s 
refusal to accept Jews who are Christians the ‘right to return’, even when they have kept their 
Jewish religious identity. 10 These matters are important for the future of genuine dialogue between 
Jews, Muslims and Catholics.  
Theology of religions and a fuller historiography. Fr Schenk remarks that there is a need for a more 
historically expansive account of the theology of religions before a better systematic account of 
other religions is forthcoming, I am in full agreement. Louis Capéran and Jacques Dupuis have begun 
this task. 11 What is required and has hardly begun is a careful sifting of historical genealogies of both 
                                                          
10 See the most interesting story of Oswald Rufeisen, a Catholic Jewish monk, who challenged the government 
on this matter because he had never renounced his Jewish religious identity and culture and was in fact a 
Zionist. See Nechma Tec, In the Lion’s Den. The Life of Oswald Rufeisen, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1990), especially 210-22.  
 
11 See Capéran, Louis (1912):  Le Salut des Infidèles: essai historique, (Paris: Louis Beauchesne); Dupuis, Jacques 
(1977): Towards a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism (Maryknoll, Orbis).  
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theologians and the magisterium in interaction, related to questions of mission, general theology of 
religions, and specific engagement with particular religions such as Judaism and Islam. As such a 
historiography develops, systematic theology will be better placed to both develop its own discipline 
as well as stimulate further historical researches. My own book is the smallest contribution to this 
very large task.  
Propositions, truth and revelation: Echeverria shows that he and I are in basic agreement regarding 
the hermeneutics of the Council and regarding the critique I provided of differing positions. He is 
very appreciative of my attempt to build a bridge between the position that affirms eternal truths 
that the Church teaches while also acknowledging that all expressions of truth are to be 
contextualized and historicized. I am grateful for his sensitive appreciation. He isolates two issues 
that require clarification in my position. First, should I deliver a metaphysical account of language to 
buttress my historicized account of doctrinal essentialism? Second, do I downplay revelation as 
proposition, or as he puts it: ‘D’Costa needs to explicitly integrate into his hermeneutics a theology 
of propositional revelation.’  
On the first, my reticence to do so was primarily because I assume, like him, that language is 
referential and thus capable of speaking truthfully. In the history of Christian theology different 
forms of philosophy have provided the resources for the prolegomena to theology. Platonism, types 
of Aristotelianism, certain forms of phenomenology, and more recently analytical philosophy have 
all provide philosophical resources to explicate the basic conviction that language is open, referential 
and realist. 12  How reference can be verified in this life is another question. Pope John Paul II’s 
masterly encyclical Faith and Reason (1998) shows the crisis produced by philosophies of 
functionalism and pragmatism. They fundamentally closed down the metaphysical and thus 
eventually eroded theology’s proper confidence, based both on philosophy and also on revelation. 
Hence, I accept Echeverria’s concern that my defence of realism be given a metaphysical explication. 
For this, I would turn to, if time had been available, to Thomas Aquinas who is the master of such a 
synthesis as Faith and Reason 44, makes clear: ‘In him, the Church's Magisterium has seen and 
recognized the passion for truth; and, precisely because it stays consistently within the horizon of 
universal, objective and transcendent truth, his thought scales “heights unthinkable to human 
intelligence”. Rightly, then, he may be called an “apostle of the truth”. Looking unreservedly to 
truth, the realism of Thomas could recognize the objectivity of truth and produce not merely a 
philosophy of “what seems to be” but a philosophy of “what is”.’ But the same encyclical also makes 
it clear that different philosophical approaches could provide what is required. My real concern in 
the book was not to provide this metaphysical account, but to assume cognitive reference and 
metaphysical realism for the argument to work.  
On the second point made by Echeverria I think we are in agreement: revelation contains 
propositions. While I think Echeverria and I would both hold that revelation is primarily the person of 
Jesus Christ, first and foremost, and the Holy Spirit and the Father of Jesus Christ, I would wish to 
emphasise that the trinity is not first a proposition but a divine mystery and reality known in history, 
and also known through propositions. I do not discount a wide variety of ways in which God makes 
Himself known: through natural laws, moral laws, the history of revelation begun in and with Israel. 
And in each of these instances, propositions are part of the reflective process (as one reflects on the 
natural and moral laws) or indeed, part of primary history (the teachings of the prophets).  
                                                          
12 See edited Oliver D. Crisp, Gavin D'Costa, Mervyn Davies, Peter Hampson, Theology and Philosophy: Faith 
and Reason, (Bloomsbury: London, 2013).  
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I would like to thanks the three respondents and the editors of this journal for paying attention to 
my book. It is an immense privilege and I hope I have done justice to the generosity of my 
respondents.  
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